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On September 23, 2016, Canadian Major General Blaise Cathcart,
Professor Ryan Goodman,1 Professor Laurie Blank,2 and Professor Dapo
Akande3 addressed the 2016 Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions of
1949.
After noting that his comments were his own and not those of the
Canadian Government, General Cathcart began by noting that sixty-four
years had passed since the previous Commentaries, making it a good time for
a fresh look at the Geneva Convention. General Cathcart offered five areas
of concern about the new Commentaries, as follows.
First, the methodology used by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC): it was unclear how the ICRC made the threshold
determination that the original Commentaries even required updating. While
there was extensive consultation during the drafting process, it is still not
apparent how the ICRC made the determination of which Commentaries
were to be updated and why.
Second, the 2016 Commentaries do not reflect the same concerns that were
raised in the peer review process of developing the drafts of the new
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Commentaries, which creates, in General Cathcart’s personal opinion, a
disconnect between the actual State Party contributions and a disconnect with
the views expressed by the peer reviewers. Being more open in how the ICRC
arrived at their own findings would be helpful in the future. He noted that the
original Commentaries followed shortly after the diplomatic conference that
lead to the Conventions, which meant the Commentaries were a direct result of
hearing from State Parties at the diplomatic conference.
Third, General Cathcart noted a lack of engagement with the State Parties
on the part of the ICRC in the updating process. The Commentaries heavily
rely upon the concept of State practice, and so the lack of engagement
creates an area of concern that needs to be explored. Without formal
engagement with the State Parties, the ICRC risks placing too much weight
on secondary sources to establish a current snapshot of the current State
Parties practice. For example, General Cathcart pointed to the reliance by
the ICRC on State military manuals. While that practice has been part of an
ongoing dialogue between the State Parties and the ICRC, military manuals
may not accurately reflect a State’s view on all of the issues, in part because
they may be a combination of legal perspectives, operational perspectives
from commanders, and policy input from policy makers and politicians. He
believes the reliance on items like military manuals highlights the validity of
his concerns with the methodology employed by the ICRC in determining
what was a State practice. The General believes that making a determination
under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is heavily fact-dependent, so
when a State is deciding upon a certain set of facts to make a conclusion, the
context of those facts and what those facts actually mean are critical to the
final outcome. A virtue of the LOAC is that it attempts to remain agnostic
about what States say is happening, in the context of an ongoing conflict
where it is clear States are using militaries to fight each other, versus what
States actually do, and that does not seem to be reflected in the new
Commentaries, according to General Cathcart.
Fourth, the General commented on the over-reliance on Customary
International Law (CIL). The Commentaries come to conclusions that are
reflections of CIL, when there seems to be insufficient evidence presented of
State practice to come to such a conclusion. That was a concern already
identified by several States, like the United States, and others in their studies
on customary international law.
The General feels that the new
Commentaries provide a wealth of interpretive guidance to States Parties and
LOAC practitioners, but the weakness is where there are poorly supported
claims that are made up of the provision of norms that have been made into
binding CIL by the new Commentaries. In essence, the General worries
about the ICRC relying too heavily on its own views of CIL to come to
poorly supported conclusions.
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Finally, General Cathcart believes that the ICRC takes an overly
expansive view of Article 1, in that it legally requires States Parties to ensure
other State Parties or non-State actors are respecting the Conventions in
conflicts where the State Party is not a participant. He suggested that a more
narrow interpretation would be welcomed. The General recognized that
these areas, such as ensuring respect by other State Parties, are contentious,
but that perhaps the ICRC was being too aspirational which resulted in some
confusion and concern by the States Parties.
Professor Goodman turned to the question of asking what the lifespan of
the new Commentaries will be. Professor Goodman felt one of the most
important things to consider when reading the new Commentaries is that the
2016 Commentaries marked an axial shift by the ICRC with respect to the
application of LOAC, especially to non-international armed conflict. There
has been, according to Professor Goodman, a “backwards flip” by the ICRC,
in the sense that the ICRC traditionally attempts to find ways in which
international humanitarian law (IHL) or LOAC would apply to situations of
violence, but in fact there are in the Commentaries two situations in which
IHL does not apply. This is likely due in large part to the events surrounding
September 11, 2001. Before September 11, many states resisted applying
LOAC in dealing with terrorist organizations. This, in part, was because
State Parties resisted the idea of legitimizing terrorist organizations by
thinking of them as lawful combatants, rather than just armed thugs and
criminals. The ICRC and other humanitarian organizations pushed for
ratification of the Conventions and for applying a low threshold for LOAC
application, so that the most fundamental of human rights could be ensured.
After September 11, the Bush Administration and others used the LOAC
and the law of targeting (LOT) in order to more aggressively target terrorist
regimes and ensure national security. The ICRC and some of the most
respected IHL scholars pushed back, and tried to place stricter limits on what
exactly an armed conflict is, resulting in a reversal of positions. This is a
concern for Professor Goodman, because, from the perspective of
humanitarian organizations, LOAC does a great job in regulating the
excessive use of force. But some States will not, in the near future, apply
human rights law to extraterritorial operations when targeting foreign
terrorist organizations, because their position will be that, even if human
rights law were to apply, LOT is not regulated by human rights law because
the acting State does not have effective control, which is necessary when
targeting an actor with lethal force.
Professor Goodman posed the question, what fills that gap? The United
States Supreme Court invalidated United States military commissions on the
basis of the application of Common Article 3 to the transnational conflict.
With respect to Al Qaeda, fair trial rights are not going to look the same
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without Common Article 3. Fair trial rights are a fundamental guarantee
under Common Article 3. When thinking of criminality, war crimes only
exist if one believes that LOAC applies. Human rights violations do not
necessarily come with criminal liability.
With respect to his points already made, Professor Goodman raised two
points regarding the 2016 Commentaries.
First is the concept of
transnational, non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). For example, a
conflict between a State and a non-State actor, not confined to the State’s
territory in the sense of a civil war, but rather conflict extending to anywhere
the enemy is located. The U.S. position was that anywhere there is a battle,
there is an armed conflict. For example, if Al Qaeda is in Pakistan and the
battle goes over into Yemen, there is also an armed conflict in Yemen. The
ICRC’s position, in the past, was that this would lead to a global battlefield.
That would be undesirable because it would create increased danger to
civilians; a central aim of international humanitarian law is the protection of
non-combatants.
In the 2016 Commentaries, Professor Goodman believes the ICRC
compromised: it accepted this concept of a “spill over” conflict, with the
condition that the armed conflict “spill over” the border to neighboring
states. Professor Goodman’s concern is that this represents a backflip from
the ICRC’s previous view. In a sense, the ICRC is stating that LOAC does
not apply transnationally, so it would not necessarily apply in Yemen under
the scenario Professor Goodman outlined, unless a neighbor of Yemen
started the conflict. Professor Goodman reads the Geneva Conventions as
having an extraordinarily low threshold for when to apply LOAC, almost to
the point that it is left to the discretion of the States. The only reason there is
not a higher threshold is because it is up to States to determine when they are
in a conflict with a belligerent, or when to recognize a belligerent. But,
according to Professor Goodman, the 2016 Commentaries apply this “level
intensity of violence” measurement that may say LOAC does not apply in
transnational conflicts. This seems to be the reverse of ICRC’s postSeptember 11 positions, and Professor Goodman believes it is based mainly
on policy considerations.
Furthermore, Professor Goodman argues this compromise position is
arbitrary and potentially unworkable. What is the real difference between
neighboring states and a situation where there is just one state in between?
The term “neighboring” is ambiguous. Does a neighbor need to be touching
the State, or can there be a State in between the two States involved in
conflict?
A related issue for Professor Goodman is the emergence of cyber groups.
A State actor may be engaging in cyber attacks against another State very
remotely, which would seem to result in a transnational conflict. The 2016
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Commentaries do recognize the role of cyber activities, because the
Commentaries say that the group causing the conflict could be organized
sufficiently in the cyber world to count as an organized armed group.
Further, cyber activities alone could be sufficiently violent to trigger
protections under the 2016 Commentaries. But, Professor Goodman pointed
out, this highlights the arbitrary nature of the compromise position of the
2016 Commentaries, in that a purely cyber group initiating a purely cyber
attack with cyber weapons and not physically organized would require to be
in a neighboring State. To Professor Goodman, that is an arbitrary and
unworkable distinction. The ICRC suggests that such incidents have to be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Professor Goodman admitted he had a
question based upon the relationship between the 2016 Commentaries and
recent scholarship suggesting that NIACs are governed by the Conventions
regardless of territorial location, which suggests an answer quite different
from the position of the 2016 Commentaries.
Professor Goodman also believes Common Article 1 is sweeping in its
application in that all State Parties have an obligation to ensure respect for the
Conventions in any conflict, regardless of whether that State Party has a
connection to the armed conflict, and regardless of the identities of the Parties
to the conflict. Professor Goodman worries that this interpretation will
undermine the acceptance of the 2016 Commentaries by State Parties because
it strays so far from what he believes was the original intent of the Framers of
the Conventions in 1949. For example, Professor Goodman noted that it took
decades for States to accept the concept that they even had the prerogative to
scrutinize the human rights practices of other States. Professor Goodman
offered a portion of a speech by a United States officer given immediately
prior to the release of the 2016 Commentaries that explicitly refuted such an
expansive interpretation that Common Article 1 and he noted that, in 1973, the
United States stated, in writing, that Common Article 1 did not require
international supervision, but rather that Common Article 1 required States to
use their influence to induce respect for the Conventions.
Finally, Professor Goodman noted that the ICRC takes the position that
LOAC does not necessarily mean force can be used in a NIAC, which is
remarkably in step with the way the Obama Administration, since 2013, has
divided up the world in the sense of hostile areas and non-hostile areas. And,
Professor Goodman notes, positively, that the ICRC holds that
proportionality and collateral damage must be taken into account when using
lethal force, and that does not just include civilians but also non-combatant
members of a military force, similar to the position of the United States
Department of Defense.
Professor Blank began her comments by discussing the relationship
between the original Commentaries, with a capital “C,” and the 2016
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Commentaries, which she suggests should have a lower case “c.” One major
reason for this is that the original Commentaries were written by the same
actors who wrote the Geneva Convention. Professor Blank offered an
analogy of the Founding Fathers publishing commentaries shortly after
writing the Constitution. The writers of the original Commentaries knew
certain provisions of the Geneva Convention had been written to combat
specific acts within the Second World War, and the original Commentaries
were written to address those acts. Professor Blank suggested the 2016
Commentaries may lack this authority, and instead serve the more traditional
role as simply “comments” on the Geneva Convention. She believes it is
important to keep in mind the goals the provisions were trying to achieve
when originally written and how those goals have changed after sixty years
of world events. Professor Blank noted that many state actors with varying
viewpoints created the original Commentaries, and more have arrived since
then, a fact which itself alters how we view the two Commentaries.
One overarching question for Professor Blank is what are the 2016
Commentaries meant to do? The challenge is determining whether the
Commentaries are meant to serve as the black letter representation of the
boundaries of the Geneva Convention or whether they are meant to represent
positions and aspirations of what the law should be. Currently, the 2016
Commentaries seem to fall in between and serve as a resource of information
and a tool for attacking issues and offer very detailed analysis, whereas the
original Commentaries seem to offer a more broad view of events and not
fine details. Because the 2016 Commentaries are so detailed, they can be an
amazing resource. However, challenges remain in using the Commentaries
because they cannot give us a direct answer for every situation but can only
help us consider the issue. Professor Blank offered several questions that,
for her, remain: what does consent mean; what if the public is protesting,
asking for international help, how is that supposed to be evaluated?
Similar to the challenges in defining civilians from non-civilians, where
there was a gap between those two definitions, the 2016 Commentaries have
tried to clarify what exactly a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) is
and how it is different from an International Armed Conflict (IAC). Yet, in
trying to better define these terms, the 2016 Commentaries have created a
fragmented definition of each, and perhaps will affect how LOAC is applied.
Situations are sure to arise that do not fit neatly into either category but
rather fall somewhere in between.
Finally, Professor Blank raised what she considered a point of tension
between what appears to be an effort in the 2016 Commentaries to maintain
as broad of a concept of conflict as possible, particularly with the idea that
perhaps there is an IAC anytime a State uses force against a non-State group
in another State, and with what seems to be a careful restriction or approach

2017]

PUBLIC PANEL RAPPORTEUR SESSION

535

as to how and when the rules apply. She noted that most of the debates in
crafting the 2016 Commentaries centered on defining this “thing” [NAIC] to
which all of the Geneva Conventions would apply, but it [NAIC] is still not
armed conflict; at some point, Professor Blank said, the 2016 Commentary
authors gave up and decided instead to craft rules to apply when the conflict
is not an IAC.
Finally, Professor Akande evaluated some of the differences between the
original Commentaries and the 2016 Commentaries.
The original
Commentaries, in Professor Akande’s view, have been afforded an
“unjustifiable” authority, almost synonymous with the black letter law. This is
primarily because the Geneva Conventions were enacted within the lifetime of
the author of the original Commentaries, giving those authors a unique
perspective and deep understanding of the Geneva conventions. The original
Commentaries are also more authoritative because they were published shortly
after the Geneva Conventions. Thus, the lack of authority within the 2016
Commentaries is not due to the merit of the work but instead the timing of the
publication. With each new commentary published, authority will inevitably
diminish. The 2016 Commentaries will likely be seen as academic work rather
than something akin to black letter law like the original Commentaries.
Professor Akande noted that the work of producing the 2016
Commentaries brings about good questions surrounding general international
law and treaty interpretation. The 2016 Commentaries provide good material
when thinking about how we view treaties and how those views adapt and
change over time. The emphasis actors place on treaty interpretation plays a
major role in how to use these Commentaries.
Finally, one area of critique within the 2016 Commentaries is that they do
not clearly communicate the changes between the original Commentaries and
the 2016 Commentaries consistently. This lack of clear and consistent
communication is illustrated through three examples. First is the changing
definition of NIAC and Consent. We know Common Article 2 governs
between two States in conflict. But what happens if an attack on a non-state
actor is perpetuated within a foreign state without that foreign state’s consent,
does this create an International Armed Conflict between the State using force
and the State in which the force is being exerted (i.e., the United States attacks
ISIS within Syria without Syria’s consent)? The original Commentaries seem
to suggest, in Professor Akande’s view, that for there to be an IAC there must
be the involvement of two armed forces. However, the 2016 Commentaries
explicitly states that such an interpretation is too narrow. Second, the changing
definition of “occupation” within Common Article 2 is noted in a different
way. Before the Fourth Geneva Convention, the 1907 Hague Convention
defined occupation as when territory was actually under the control of another.
However, under the original Commentaries the definition was changed in a
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way that an action as small as a patrol could be considered occupation. In the
2016 Commentaries, the original 1907 Hague definition was not altered, and
has re-adopted that definition of occupation. Finally, Professor Akande noted
there is a variance in whose consent is necessary for the implementation of
humanitarian services within Common Articles 9 and 10 of the Fourth
Conventions. Those Common Articles state that the ICRC and other
humanitarian organizations can offer their services, but that the “Parties
concerned” must consent in order for the organizations to assist. The law does
not clearly articulate what “Parties concerned” means. The original
Commentaries indicated that the “Parties concerned” must be taken to mean all
those upon which the possibility of carrying out the aid would impact. The
2016 Commentaries state that the State through which the aid must pass is not
a “Party concerned” as it relates only to this provision.
Professor Akande pointed out that, in the first change between the
original Commentaries and the 2016 Commentaries, the 2016 Commentaries
explicitly acknowledged that change by reference to the original
Commentary and explained why the change was made. However, the second
change he noted, that change was indicated, but was done so by footnote.
Finally, in the third example, the change was not even referenced, and in
fact, there was no indication that there was a change between the original
Commentaries and the 2016 Commentaries.
Professor Akande proposed that the ICRC adopt a method in which the
Commentaries clearly acknowledge the changes being made between the
original and new Commentaries. The new commentaries should give
justification for the law being changed. This holds true whether it is
acknowledging the original Commentaries were wrong and that the law
needed to be changed, or if it is acknowledging that case law has been made
or events have conspired that changes the ICRC’s interpretation. Regardless
of the reason, the Commentaries should acknowledge each change made,
offer adequate justification for each, and do so consistently throughout.

